In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dewey on Metaphysics, Meaning Making, and Maps James W. Garrison Blueprints and maps are propositions and they exemplify what it is to be propositional.1 [E]very characteristic trait is a quality.... produced and destroyed by existential conditions.2 John Dewey's claim that there are metaphysical generic traits of existence the theory of which provides "a ground-map" for cultural criticism remains controversial. I will work along two intertwining lines to try (...) and clear things up a bit. First, many assume that his reference to a metaphysical map is a metaphor. My paper will show that he uses the idea of a map consistently in many different places throughout his career. Second, my paper will examine how Dewey functionally coordinates ordinary existential traits and their maps within his theory of judgment. We will find that the generic traits and the ground-map of criticism connect in much the same way. Before examining Dewey's theory of judgment, I want to say something about where Dewey's metaphysics fits into his empirical "denotative method." In the conclusion, we wiU look at where metaphysics fits into the architectonic of his entire phUosophy. In between, we wiU examine maps functioning as propositions (especiaUy logical and mathematical universals) as weU as ever-evolving guides to unending inquiry in an unfinished and unfinishable universe. Eventually we wiU see why Dewey insists that "the social" is "The Inclusive PhUosophic Idea." Metaphysics, for Dewey, is simply one tool of cultural criticism among others. First and Last Philosophy in Dewey's Denotative Method Dewey's "denotative method" moves from the immediately given intuitive meanings of qualitative "having" of experience that impart a "sense" of a qualitative, organically whole TRANSACTIONS OFTHE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 41, No. 4 ©2005 O situation from whence we may select traits, through the experience of "significant " linguistic meanings, such as the propositions of judgment, to the experience of "knowing" as the product of the logical process of inquiry, and back again to primary experience.4 Each phase interpenetrates every 3 other. Here is how Dewey describes the trans-action between primary, noncognitive and secondary, cognitive experience in his original (1925) >■$ introduction to Experience and Nature: ^r There are two avenues of approach to the goal of philosophy. We may " begin with experience in gross, experience in its primary and crude forms ^ [e.g., traits].... Or, we may begin with refined selective products, the a most authentic statements of commended methods of science [e.g., ¿q maps], and work from them back to the primary facts of life. ^ P TT ϕ > Philosophy may start with either immediate existential experience or the 3 experience of mediating meanings. While we may distinguish these two L starting points, we should never construct a dualism from them since both jx occur within experience.6 Dewey explains that "the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of reflection ""O which constructs the secondary objects of reflection."7 Further, "crude or macroscopic experience" provides the "test and verification" of the secondary objects of reflection. Secondary objects "explain the primary objects, 2 they enable us to grasp them with understanding!'9 The two starting points " differ in direction, but eventually they close to form a circle of expanding? dence. They may then pioneer new pathways, or, having different values, D choose to construct different kinds of maps. ^ Douglas Browning distinguishes "three phases of discussion of the start- 0 ing point."23 The first concerns "the designation of a certain subject matter P1 referred to under the names 'experience' and 'my life'."24 Dewey's empirical « denotative method selects aspects from immediate qualitative experience. The >% second phase involves two things: First, "a reflective moving away from and looking back upon that subject-matter" and, second, "the bringing of a puta- S tive characterization against it." Browning's example of characterization is g "the catalogue of the generic traits of experience." The generic traits are not S antecedent to inquiry; rather they are the products of reflection used to char- 5 ' acterize primary experience. Browning observes that characterization is always ^ provisional; as we wiU find, Dewey insists that the theoretical map proposi- ^ tionaUy representing the existential... (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmotional events tend to be remembered better than neutral events, but emotional states and stimuli may also interfere with cognitive processes that underlie memory performance. The current study investigated the effects of emotional content on working memory capacity, which involves both short term storage and executive attention control. We tested competing hypotheses in a preregistered experiment. The emotional enhancement hypothesis predicts that emotional stimuli attract attention and additional processing resources relative to neutral stimuli, thereby making it easier to encode and (...) store emotional information in WMC. The emotional impairment hypothesis, by contrast, predicts that emotional stimuli interfere with attention control and the active maintenance of information in working memory. Participants completed a common measure of WMC (the operation span task; Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. [1989]. Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of Memory and Language, 28,... (shrink)

This chapter presents an edited e-mail discussion based on the philosophical conversations at a conference held in Cologne, Germany, in December 2001. The discussion proceeds in three steps. First, the contributors discuss selected questions about their contributions, roughly following the sequence of the chapters in Part II of this book. Second, the contributors ask more general questions about Dewey, Pragmatism, and constructivism. Finally, the chapter ends with brief statements about why Dewey is still an indispensible thinker for them. As they (...) clarify their differences and seek common ground, they articulate concepts such as power, truth, relativism, inquiry, and democracy from Pragmatist and interactive constructivist vantage points, in ways designed to render the preceding essays even more accessible. In their views, the concluding discussion demonstrates both the enduring relevance of classical Pragmatism and the challenge of its reconstruction from the perspective of the Cologne program of interactive constructivism. (shrink)

A thorough account of Africa's history and its lasting influence on Western culture told from the perspective of the disparate descendants who inherited its legacy. W.E.B. Du Bois highlights the hidden stories that connect these varied communities. Originally published in 1915, The Negro presents an expansive analysis of the African diaspora over the course of history. W.E.B. Du Bois uses a critical eye to survey the early depictions of the continent, debunking stereotypical myths about its social structure. He addresses the (...) generational impact of slavery as well as the capitalistic system that made it possible. It's an honest look at the effects of white supremacy, classism and its place in modern society. From Ethiopia and Egypt to the West Indies and Latin America, Africa's influence is undeniable. The Negro sheds light on the ignored history of the continent and its many descendants. It's a vital piece of literature that acknowledges and celebrates its cultural power. With an eye-catching new cover, and professionally typeset manuscript, this edition of The Negro is both modern and readable. (shrink)

William Abraham studied Philosophy at the University of Ghana, and even more Philosophy at Oxford University. Thereafter, he gained permission to take part in the competitive examination and interview for a fellowship at All Souls' College. The examination was once described, with some exaggeration, as 'the hardest exam in the world!' It included a three-hour essay. Following his success in becoming the first African fellow of All Souls, his interest in African politics quickly developed into a Pan-African perspective. The Mind (...) of Africa, written while he was still at All Souls, was a fruit of that enlarged perspective. After several years as a Fellow, he had occasion to visit Ghana in 1962. There Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, successfully persuaded him to return to Ghana to teach at the University of Ghana, Legon and he subsequently resigned from All Souls. In 1968, he went to the United States as a visiting professor. This was followed by invitations to teach at various academic institutions there, including Berkeley and Stanford. He subsequently settled in California, where he continued to teach and research philosophy in the University of California at Santa Cruz until his retirement. The Mind of Africa appeared at a time when a number of African countries were obtaining, or fighting for, their political freedom from their colonial rulers and becoming independent nations and expecting to build new societies in accordance with their own visions and conceptions, though not necessarily jettisoning all the features of their colonial heritage. Building new societies requires appropriate ideologies and philosophies fashioned within the crucible of their cultural and historical experiences. Thus, the relation between ideology and society is taken up at the very outset of the book... The Mind of Africa is important for Africa's future and identity. (shrink)

This chapter presents an essay by W. E. B. Du Bois on the strivings of the American Negro. He cites the double-consciousness of the Negro, the sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength (...) alone keeps it from being torn asunder. He argues that the history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self—conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. (shrink)

Subtitled "Ideas and Arguments from Plato to Sartre," this volume is intended, as are many others, to serve both as a textbook for introductory courses in philosophy and as an introduction to philosophic thinking. One of its goals, and one admirably achieved, is to provide some hearing both to all the very greatest figures in the history of western philosophy and to some major opposing traditions. No one can read the volume and fail to grasp something of the content and (...) spirit in the work of such men as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and others. What makes Flew's work creative and original is a combination of factors. First of all, he combines in a very stimulating and integral way two methods commonly adopted in works of this kind, namely representative selections from original sources and expository and critical commentary. Almost one half of the work consists of material taken from the primary sources, but these selections are not set off in large chunks interspersed with commentary. Rather they are worked into the text to illustrate the thrust of the arguments and ideas involved, and thus we find Hobbes' militant manifesto of metaphysical materialism confronting the Eleatic Stranger's argument for the existence of "certain incorporeal Forms which are objects of the mind" in The Sophist, Hume's views on finality contrasted with the argument developed by Aquinas in his fifth way, and Frege's polemic against confusing the logical with the psychological set opposite the arguments of Locke concerning the meaning of human understanding. In addition, in offering his own critical comment Flew deliberately seeks to set forth his own conclusions even in areas that have been and are controversial. Thus the work is by no means an impersonal account but conveys something of the enthusiasm and excitement that the author experiences in trying to forge sound arguments and assess the soundness of arguments advanced by others--and this, for Flew, is the principal work of the philosopher. One could argue over many of the nuances that Flew's way of proceeding gives to the meaning of the philosophies discussed, but this in no way detracts from the value of this stimulating and exceptionally informative introduction.--W. E. M. (shrink)

William Ernest Johnson was a renowned British logician and economist, and also a fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Originally published in 1921, this book forms the first of a three-volume series by Johnson relating to 'the whole field of logic as ordinarily understood'. The series is widely regarded as Johnson's greatest achievement, making a significant contribution to the tradition of philosophical logic. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Johnson's theories, philosophy and the historical development (...) of logic. (shrink)

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self-contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self-contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self-contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a (...) sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic. (shrink)

The idea of organism, which of recent years has bulked so largely in scientific, and especially in biological, theory has been developed mainly in reference to living organisms, and has been extended to cover such systems as human societies, crystals, molecules and atoms—and indeed the whole universe has been interpreted as an organism. This use of the term, however, includes different ways in which parts may be together in a system. The belief that the principle of organism has been wrongly (...) extended to explain certain co-ordinations of vital processes which require a different type of explanation is the reason for this addition to the immense literature on the subject of organism. (shrink)

"Aristotle was a systematic writer who often cross-referred to the definitions of terms given elsewhere in his work. Book 5 of the Metaphysics is important because it consists of definitions of the main uses of key terms in Aristotle's philosophy, and it is extremely valuable to have a commentary on this important text by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading commentator of his school. Alexander provides a detailed commentary on all of the thirty terms analysed in Book 5, weighing alternative interpretations (...) of what Aristotle says one against another, defending Peripatetic views against actual and possible criticisms, and attempting to integrate what is said in Book 5 into the context of the Metaphysics as a whole."--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)